

Exploring Assymmetric Defence Strategies


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
Long Term Defence Planning in Norway

- Continuous defence planning
 - by the MoD
 - modifications to current plans if and when necessary
- White Paper every four years
 - full review of current medium and long term plans
 - preceded and informed by CHOD's defence study
- FFI supports MoD and CHOD
 - threats and challenges
 - capability analysis
 - cost studies
 - concept development


The planning process



Capability Based Planning at FFI



Capability analysis



Scenario class	2014	2018	2022	2034
Strategic assault	Red	Red	Red	Red
Limited attack	Orange	Orange	Orange	Orange
Coercive diplomacy	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Terror attack	Light Green	Light Green	Light Green	Light Green
Crime	Green	Green	Green	Green
Peacetime tasks	Green	Green	Green	Green

Something needs to be done

Strategic environment and constraints:

- Norway is a small(ish) country
- we have a big neighbour
- we are a member of NATO

The current defence posture is defensive

- stop expansion of enemy forces / denial ops
- involve NATO
- secure allied reinforcements
- engage enemy when possible

Capability-based planning is a useful tool if a balanced force is achievable

- if not, radical alternatives should be explored

FFI has initiated a “Deterrence Study”

- alternative defence concepts
- asymmetric response to the most demanding scenarios


How to achieve a defensive threshold?

The aim is to deter a potential aggressor from using military force against Norway by:


- 1. making it so costly to attack us – in terms of loss of materiel, personnel, prestige and/or other strategic resources – that the potential gain of attacking is outweighed by the cost, and/or*
- 2. ensuring, through own (military, political, diplomatic) effort, that an attack will result in a situation that facilitates Alliance engagement*

The assumption is that the initial effort must be – because of compressed timelines and lack of advance warning – handled by national forces


Alternative Defence Concepts




Defensive posture




Tripwire



Strategic retaliation



NATO integration



Operational deterrence

Operational Deterrence (A2/AD)


The main goal of the defensive battle is to incur substantial losses on the attacking forces

- seek out the enemy forces and attack his high value targets
- much less emphasis on defending and holding terrain
- reducing own vulnerabilities by minimising reliance on forward infrastructure and heavy, low-mobility units
- maintain combat intensity over time to ensure Alliance involvement

Realised through offensive strike capabilities combining stand-off weapons, distributed sensor networks and/or platforms that can penetrate enemy defences and strike him directly, like submarines, stealth a/c and SOF.

Assessment:

- potential to realise a coherent concept within given economic constraints (not full-spectrum, scalable)
- dependent on potentially vulnerable comms networks
- dependent on high volume of stand-off PGMs (cost?)



Development of the concept

Definition of a draft force structure


- offensive firepower
- defensive capabilities as required
- unbalanced
- (unrealistic)

War gaming / table tops

- defined a number of offensive and defensive tactical vignettes
- invited experts / technologists from all divisions at FFI
- explore new technologies / tactical concepts
- testing the force structure

Critical areas:

- robust communications
- ISTAR
- munitions



Results and further work

The study has contributed to the defence debate

- within the armed forces / MoD and in the public domain
- contributed to a *strategic* discussion

The study is on-going

- further refinement of the force structure
- bring in external expertise
- define support structure
- cost analysis

Conclusions

- Advantages of a structured approach to long-term planning:
 - focus on capabilities
 - clear audit trail
 - repeatable
 - highlighting problem areas in advance
 - identify strategic trade-offs
- Focus should be on achieving balance between tasks, budgets and force structure
- But also important to allow a many-dimensional approach to defence planning
 - encourage creativity
 - challenge existing concepts